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we be? (Retrenchment might parallel a similar Bush administration move toward re 
gional and bilateral trade policy, where avoiding multilateral negotiations facilitates the 
exercise of relative U.S. power in securing deeper trade integration and the leverage 
to secure better terms of trade in nonweapons-sensitive market sectors.) I raise these 
questions about the continued utility of existing multilateral regimes in the spirit of 
Lord Keynes, who also said, "Words ought to be a litde wild, for they are the assault of 
thoughts on the unthinking."9 If there were ever any doubt, the death of more than 
three thousand American and foreign nationals on September 11th now clearly estab 
lishes the need to think through arms control and nonproliferation policy from the 
ground up, so that law follows good policy and the shackles of international law do not 
prevent us from getting things right. 
Let us now look at the real world gains in international security to be achieved in arms 
control and nonproliferation policies as we grapple with these larger questions of legal 
strategy. Department of Defense Associate Deputy General Counsel Jack Beard will now 
address the bilateral efforts of the Bush administration to address the threat of chemi 
cal and biological weapons proliferation, particularly in the soft underbelly of Russia, 
the region of greatest strategic interest today. 
A New Urgency About Anthrax: 
Recent Efforts to Prevent the Proliferation 
of Biological Weapons in the Former Soviet Union 
by Jack M. Beard* 
The threat of biological weapons, once an obscure topic to most Americans, achieved 
new prominence and urgency in the United States with the anthrax letter attacks that 
followed the terrorist attacks of September 11, 200L A number of infections traced to 
a handful of anthrax-laced letters focused unprecedented attention in America on the 
danger of biological weapons (BW). Coupled with continuing reports of attempts by 
terrorists to acquire weapons of mass destruction, this has made efforts to prevent BW 
proliferation a high priority for the U.S. government. 
Notwithstanding the new prominence of the BW threat, the U.S. government recendy 
withdrew its support of a seven-year effort to create a new protocol to improve moni 
toring and inspections under the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).1 Con 
cerned that the protocol's approach would compromise sensitive biological defense and 
confidential business information and would do nothing to increase compliance with 
the BWC, U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security 
John Bolton, told a UN Conference on the Biological Weapons Convention that "the 
United States will simply not enter into agreements that allow rogue states or others to 
develop and deploy biological weapons," stating that the draft biological weapons 
protocol "is dead in our view and not to be resurrected."2 The United States also sought 
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to focus attention on the number of BWC member countries with offensive BW pro 
grams. In response, domestic and foreign commentators strongly cridcized the U.S. 
position, questioning America's commitment to this and other multilateral efforts.3 
Although the United States rejected the proposed BWC protocol, it continues to com 
bat the threat posed by biological weapons by other means, including increased bilateral 
efforts to prevent the proliferation of biological weapons. In a recent meeting with the 
president of Russia, President Bush declared that "our highest priority is to keep terrorists 
from acquiring weapons of mass destruction" and that Mwe will strengthen our efforts 
to cut off every possible source of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons, materials, 
and expertise."4 In this regard, there is no greater threat than that posed by the legacy 
of the Soviet Union's BW program. In addition to five military microbiological facilities 
under the control of the Soviet Ministry of Defense, it has been reported that as many 
as forty-seven other scientific institutes and production facilities worked on biological 
weapons under the cover of numerous other Soviet ministries and organizations. Many 
of these only recently came to light after Russian President Boris Yeltsin officially ac 
knowledged the existence of an offensive BW program in April 1992.5 
The legacy of the Soviet BW Program, coupled with economic problems in the states 
of the former Soviet Union (FSU), has posed a serious threat of proliferation of BW 
related expertise (the "brain drain" of former weapons scientists); smuggling or unauth 
orized transit of pathogenic agents; and export and diversion of BW-related equipment, 
including dual-use technology.6 While many ofthe Soviet BW complexes and production 
centers were located in Russia, two other former Soviet states, Kazakhstan and Uzbeki 
stan, also have inherited substantial portions of this deadly BW infrastructure. The Scien 
tific Experimental and Production Base at Stepnogorsk, Kazakhstan has been called by 
experts the Soviet Union's main facility for the manufacture of biological weapons and 
was in fact "one of the largest installations ever created for this purpose."7 It was at 
Stepnogorsk that research teams developed the Soviet Union's most deadly weapons 
grade anthrax agents. Other facilities in Kazakhstan, such as the Scientific Research 
Agricultural Institute, developed agents harmful to livestock and plants.8 On an isolated 
island named Vozrozhdeniye in the Aral Sea, the government of Uzbekistan is now con 
fronted with the vast infrastructure that supported the Soviet Union's major open-air 
BW testing range.9 In addition to being the site for testing pathogens such as tularemia, 
Q^ever, brucellosis, glanders and the plague, Vozrozhdeniye is also the world's largest 
anthrax burial ground.10 
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U.S. government agencies are actively working to prevent the proliferation of BW 
related expertise in Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan through a variety of mechanisms. 
For example, the Department of State has direct responsibility for several nonprolif 
eration programs in these countries, helping establish or strengthen export control 
systems, providing better nonproliferation tools for export licensing and tracking, and 
overseeing U.S. participation in the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) 
in Russia.11 The ISTC supports such activities as research projects that provide "incen 
tives for weapons scientists to refrain from cooperating with terrorist groups or states" 
and redirects them to "sustainable careers in peaceful, transparent civilian endeavors."12 
With numerous countries reportedly seeking former Soviet weapons scientists to further 
their own BW programs,13 these efforts to prevent the proliferation of BW-related ex 
pertise enjoy substantial U.S. government support. 
The Department of Defense (DoD), through the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) 
Program, is particularly active in what the DoD refers to as "Biological Weapons Prolif 
eration Prevention" (BWPP) projects. These BWPP projects help FSU states dismande 
former Soviet BW research and production facilities; consolidate, secure, and eliminate 
pathogenic stocks; and conduct targeted collaborative research with FSU scientists. As 
a DoD official stated in testimony before Congress, "in our view, the Biological Weapons 
Proliferation Prevention aspect of the CTR program is of exceptional, and increasing, 
importance."14 
Under the auspices of the ISTC, the DoD is collaborating on research projects at 
numerous Russian facilities and is also active in projects that improve the physical 
security of dangerous pathogens and biological materials. Additional ISTC projects 
designed by the DoD to support BWPP objectives are planned. Besides sponsoring ISTC 
projects in Russia, the DoD is working closely with counterpart agencies on BWPP 
activities in Kazakhstan under an agreement concerning weapons of mass destruction 
infrastructure elimination (WMDIE Agreement).15 These efforts include assistance in 
dismantling and demilitarizing BW facilities at Stepnogorsk, enhancing biological safety 
and security, and dismanding excess equipment and infrastructure at the Anti-Plague 
Institute in Almaty and the Scientific Research Agriculture Institute in Otar. Some of 
this assistance is provided under an annex to the WMDIE Agreement that is a frame 
work for assistance related to "biological material protection, control, and accountabil 
ity to conserve, characterize and protect strain collections of microorganisms and to 
prevent the proliferation of biological material that could contribute to the prolifera 
tion of weapons of mass destruction."16 
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It is in Uzbekistan, however, that the DoD has made perhaps the most notable prog 
ress since September 11th. After years of analysis and preliminary talks, but within just 
weeks of the September terrorist attacks on the United States, the DoD and the Uzbeki 
stan Ministry of Defense signed an agreement to dismande and demilitarize the BW 
infrastructure on Vozrozhdeniye Island and to help Uzbekistan prevent proliferation 
of BW technology and dangerous pathogens.17 This agreement was viewed as particu 
larly timely in light of the fact that some of the anthrax buried at Vozrozhdeniye was a 
highly virulent strain with thick protective capsules resistant to most common antibi 
otics, qualities that made it an ideal target for theft by terrorists: "Federal officials feared 
that al Qaeda terrorists from neighboring Afghanistan might be able to obtain viable 
anthrax spores from the soil of the island . . . avoiding some of the technical hurdles 
involved in developing a weaponized strain of anthrax."18 Administration officials noted 
that this agreement and a number of other U.S. government efforts together "reflect 
President Bush's determination to bolster the nation's biological warfare defenses in 
the wake of a spate of letters containing anthrax spores."19 Other commentators noted 
that although the focus in times of crisis tends to be on havoc and fear, the agreement 
with Uzbekistan could be viewed as a "collateral benefit."20 Moving quickly to begin dis 
manding the BW infrastructure and eliminate pathogens at Vozrozhdeniye, the DoD 
is now hoping to expand the BWPP program to Georgia and Ukraine. 
Thus, while the United States has been criticized for rejecting the draft BWC proto 
col, the events of September 11 and the subsequent anthrax letter attacks in the United 
States have focused more attention on other effective measures the U.S. government 
is undertaking, including increased bilateral efforts to dismande the BW legacy of the 
former Soviet Union. These accelerated efforts, which include assistance in dismanding 
and demilitarizing former production and research facilities, programs to consolidate, 
control and secure dangerous pathogens, and collaborative research to prevent the 
proliferation of BW-related expertise, are part of a growing, proactive, and targeted 
bilateral BW nonproliferation strategy. This proactive bilateral strategy, which is only 
part of the U.S. government's efforts in this area, contrasts with the difficulties and frus 
trations experienced by the United States in its efforts to promote implementation of 
effective multilateral measures to counter the threat posed by biological weapons. 
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